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Intervenor, Tungsten Holdings, Inc., submits the following in reply to the Brief of 
Respondents, Patrick and Ada Gardiner. 
I. ISSUES PRESENTED 
As the challengers of the decision by the Boundary County Board of Con~missioners, the 
Gardiners must first show the Board committed error under I.C. 67-5279(3), and secondly that 
such error has prejudiced a substantial right of that party: 
[Tlhe Court shall affinn the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; @) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. (Citations omitted). The party attacking the agency's action must first 
illustrate that it erred in the manner specified therein and must then show that a 
substantial right of the party has been prejudiced. Neiphbovs v. Valley County, 
- Idaho --, 176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007). 
The Gardiners' three (exclusive of their clailn for attorney's fees and costs) "Additional Issues 
Presented on Appeal", and eight separate points of "Argument", can be distilled into the 
following: 
A. Was the decision of the Board in violation of constitutional or statutory 
provisions? 
B. Was the decision of the Board made upon unlawful procedure? 
C. Was the decision of the Board supported by substantial evidence in the record? 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. The approval of the special use permit allowing the operation of a gravel pit 
and rock quarry on the Tungsten property was consistent with applicable constitutional 
and statutory provisions. 
1. Idaho Code 67-6512 allows counties to include provisions in their zoning 
ordinances for processing and approval of applications for uses not otherwise specified. 
ldaho Code 3 67-65 12(a) provides: 
67-6512. Special use permits, conditions and procedures. 
(a) As part of a zoning ordinance each governing board may provide by 
ordinance adopted, amended, or repealed in accordance with the notice and 
hearing procedures provided under section 67-6509, ldaho Code, for the 
processing of applications for special or conditional use permits. A special use 
permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is conditionally 
permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions pursuant to 
specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of political 
subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the proposed use, 
and when it is not in conflict with the plan. (Emphasis added). 
Analysis of a statute or ordinance begins with the literal language of the enactment. Friends of 
Favm to Mavlzet v. Valley County, 137 ldaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002), (citations omitted) 
A clear and simnple reading of I.C. § 67-6512, taken as a whole, reflects the legislature's 
recognition that not all potential uses of land can be neatly categorized into one zone or another. 
Sonle more intensive land uses could be considered and allowed if conditions of approval make 
thein compatible with other uses allowed in a particular zone. Semantic gymnastics aside, I.C. § 
67-6512(a) appears to use "special" and "conditional" interchangeably.' The purpose, though, 
remains the same -- to allow counties to adopt ordinances that allow for the processing of other 
I Interestingly, the use ofthe phrase "conditional use permits," appears only in subsection (a) of 
567-6512, Throughout the remainder of that section, reference is only nladc to "special use 
permits," including subsection (d), which enumerates the kinds of conditions which may be 
imposed on the granting of a "special use permit." 
than specifically identified uses (whether called "special" or "conditional"), and approving such 
"special use pennits" with conditions if needed to mitigate the potential for adverse impacts on 
other development. I.C. $ 67-65 12(d). 
2. Boundary County did that. 
Four (4) categories of uses are allowed in the AgricultureIForestry zoning district by 
Boundary County ordinance: (1) uses by right, (2) permitted uses, (3) conditional uses, and (4) 
special uses. (Zoning Ordinance Chapter 7, Section 1). Chapter 7, Section l .E then goes on to 
provide that, "Any use not spectfied as a use by right or conditional use is eligible for 
consideration as a special use, subject to the provisions &Chapter 13." To put it another way, 
otherwise unscheduled uses are to be processed as applications for special use permits. The 
Board may then impose conditions on the granting of a special use permit "to minimize potential 
adverse impacts created by the special use. In other words, special use permits are 
"conditionally permitted" under the Zoning Ordinance. (Id.). 
With its adoption of the language in Chapter 7, Section 1 .E, Boundary County enabled 
consideration of unspecified uses which may not have been anticipated at the time of adoption of 
the Zoning Ordinance, or which could be allowed with conditions of use and operation to 
mitigate potential adverse impacts on neighboring properties, and allow thein lo be 
"conditionally pennitted" in accordance with Chapter 13. The language used in the Zoning 
Ordinance for unspecified or unanticipated uses is coinparable to that used in many jurisdictions' 
zoning ordinances, and consistent with a fair reading of the intent of Idaho Code 5 67-6512, 
leaving room for future uses and needs which could be accommodated in a variety of zoning 
3. An application for a gravel pit and rock ~ u a r r v  is appropriately considered as a11 
apolicatioi~ for a "special use" in the Agriculture/Forestry zone under the Bou~ldarv County 
Zoning Ordinance and Idaho Code 6 67-6512. 
Gravel pits and rock quarries are not listed anywhere as a "conditional use", or any other 
kind of use for that matter, in the Zoning Ordinance. Nevertheless, mining, particularly non- 
metallic mining for gravel and sand, is recognized in the Boundary County Comprehensive Pla11 
as an ilnportant natural and economic resource. (AR, pp. 0252 - 0254). It is unreasonable to 
suggest that in the abscnce of specific lnention of gravel pits and rock quanies in the Zoning 
Ordinance, they simply are not allowed, specially, conditionally or otherwise, anywhere in 
Boundary County. 
The Board's application and interpretation of its Zoning Ordinance is not only entitled to 
a strong presumption of validity, it is fair, reasonable and in accordance with Idaho Code 5 67- 
6512. The Special Use Permit was "conditionally pennitted" by the Board; subject to 
restrictions and conditions imposed pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Zoning Ordinance. Under 
these circumstances, the decision of the Board was not "in excess of constitutional or statutory 
provisions," (I.C. 67-5279(3)(a)), and therefore should be affirmed on appeal. 
4. The Board's decision was in conformal~ce with the Bou~~darv County 
Comprehensive Plan. 
The Gardiners' argument that the Board's decision is inconsistent with the County's 
Comprehensive Plan inerely reflects their disagreement with the Board's conclusion that 
Tungsten's project would not unreasonably interfere with the neighbors, and that the conditions 
of approval are sufficient to mitigate any potential adverse impacts. Their argument also seems 
to reflect a belief that they are entitled to live without any interference or impacts from their 
neighbors. 
In fact, the policy of the County, reflected in its Coinprehensive Plan, is to "advocate the 
rights of property ownership, recognizing the primacy of private property rights and the sanctity 
of private property ownership as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Articles 1 and 14 of the Idaho Constitution." (AR, p. 0243). Such advocacy of 
course applies to all property owners, not just applicants, and not just their opponents. 
In this case, there are competing private property interests. The special use being applied 
for could be considered to be more intensive than other permitted uses iii the 
Agriculture/Forestry zone (although coilsider the potential intensity of historically "agricultural" 
and "forestry" activities - logging, harvesting, transporting, etc.). As such, the proposed use is 
subject to "restrictions, requirements and conditions more strillgent than those applying generally 
within the zone district." (AR, p. 0258). The proposed use may not create noise, traffic, odors, 
dust or other nuisances substantially in excess ofpermitted uses within the zone distvict. (Zoning 
Ordinance Chapter 13, Section 4.C.4, AR p. 0259). 
The Board determined that Tungsten's proposed use is in conformance with the 
Comprehensive Plan, as detailed in the Findings and Decision. (AR, pp. 0226-0227). Its 
determination in that regard reflects a balancing of the competing interests inherent in an analysis 
of compliance with a comprehensive plan, and should be affirmed on appeal 
5. The Gardiners did eniov the bellefit of an impartial tribunal. 
Because decisions in zoning matters are quasi-judicial in nature, they are subject to due 
process constraints. The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an "impartial and disinterested 
tribunal." Turner v. City o f  Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840, 846, citing Eacret v. 
Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004). "When acting upon a quasi 
judicial zoning matter, a governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal 
at issue, but sits instead in the seat of a judge." Id., citing Lowery v. Board o f  Coun& 
Commissioners for Ada Countv, 115 Idaho 64-71, 764 P.2d 431, 438 (1988). "Impartiality", 
however, does not necessarily mean "lack of preconception." Instead, it means the lack of bias 
as to either party, in order to assure the "equal application of the law." Id., citing Republican 
Party ofMinnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-76, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2535, 153 L.Ed2d 694,705 
(2002). 
In their Brief, the Gardiners point to several "layers of pre-hearing bias", which they 
assert deprived thein of an impartial tribunal. They impute nefarious motives to the Board and 
the County's road and bridge supervisor, Jeff Gutshall, from what appears to be nothing more 
than Mr. Gutshall's attempt to identify "a small rock source up north." (AR, p. 0139). They 
decry the Commissioners' support for their road supervisor in the face of heated, and what they 
felt to be unjustified, criticism leveled at him From an opponent to thc project (Mrs. Ponsness), 
who had attempted to herself develop a competing pit and sell rock to the County. (AR, pp. 
0139-0141). And, despite the stipulation to remand to cure possible taint of the proceedings by 
virtue of Co~ninissioner Dan Dinning's participation in the 2005 proceedings, they now argue the 
taint remained simply because the remaining Board members reached the same conclusion 
It would seem that Mr. Gutshall's colnmunications and efforts were legitimately within 
the scope of his duties as the County road and bridge supervisor. More importantly, they were 
disclosed as a matter of record. The Gardiner's knew about them - as evidenced by the fact that 
they are now arguing about them. 
By the same token, Commissioner Dan Dinning did NOT participate in any way, shape or 
fonn in the 2006 proceedings. The Board did hold a new hearing. While much of the testimony 
provided was redundant, all of the testimony and evidence were considered in its adoption of the 
Findings and Decision 
IJnder the circumstances, none of the Gardiners' "layers of pre-hearing bias," either 
singly or collectively, support their claim of having been denied an "impartial tribunal." 
6.  The Board's decision did not constitute unlawful "spot zoning." 
?be Gardiners hither argue that the granting of the special use permit constituted an 
illegal, "type two" spot zoning. As discussed in Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76-77,73 
P.3d 84, 89-90 (2003): 
A claim of "spot zoning" is essentially an argument the change in zoning is not in 
accord with the comprehensive plan. There are two types of "spot zoning." Type 
one spot zoning may silnply refer to a rezoliing of property for a use prohibited by 
the original zoning classification. The test for whether such a zone 
reclassification is valid is whether the zone change is in accord with the 
comprehensive plan. Type two spot zoning refers to a zone change that singles 
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the pennitted use in the rest of the 
zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner. This latter type of 
spot zoning is invalid. (Citations omitted). 
Tungsten, of course, did not apply for a change in zoning. It applied for a special use 
permit as allowed in the zoning district, to which the Board appended conditions and restrictions 
to mitigate potential adversc impacts, and to ensure that the use would not create noise, traffic, 
odors, dust or other nuisances substantially in excess ofpermitted uses within the zone district. 
(Zoning Ordinance Chapter 13, Section 4.C.4, AR p. 0259). This was not a re-zoning or a spot 
zoning. Carried to its logical extreme, the Gardiners' argument would preclude the permitting of 
any special or conditional use not specifically identified in a zoning ordinance, and regardless of 
its compatibility, with or without conditions, with outright permitted uses in the zone. 
7. The Board's "Findings and Decisions" satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code 6 
67-7535. 
The Gardiners, disagreeing with the outcome, argue that the Board's decision Iacks the 
requisite findings and conclusions to support their decision. Idaho Code S; 67-6535 requires that 
the approval or denial of a land use application be in writing and: 
Accotnpanied by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards 
considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains 
the rationale for the decision based on the av~licable vrovisions of the . . 
colnprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent 
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record. 
I.C. 67-6535(b). 
The Board's Findings and Decision entered August 7, 2006 demonstrate that the Board 
did apply the criteria prescribed by the law, and that they did not act arbitrarily or on an ad-hoc 
basis. Worbnan Family Pavlnership v. City o f  Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32 (1982). When 
considering the proceedings as a whole, in light of practical considerations and an emphasis on 
fundamental fairness (I.C. 5 67-6535(c)), the Findings and Decision approving the Special Use 
Permit are in conformance with the requirements of Idaho Code. 
The Board's findings specifically draw attention to the concerns expressed by 
surrounding landowners, most notably regarding the potential adverse effects of blasting on 
surrounding water wells and the Trow Creelc Water Association, as well as the increased dust 
and noise. Taking those factors and others into consideration, the Board imposed restrictions and 
conditions to mitigale the effects of the operations on the surrounding public. As required, the 
Board adopted findings and placed them in writing, set forth reasons for their decisions, and 
referenced the applicable county ordinance sections. Under these circumsta~~ces, the Board's 
Findings and Decision were wholly in accordance with I.C. 5 67-6535, as well as the Zoning 
Ordinance. 
B. The decision of the Board was reached after following lawful procedure. 
The Gardiners urge, this Court to conclude, as the District Court did, that the Board had 
improperly failed to hold Tungsten to the "burden of persuasion" as to all of the requirements for 
a special use pennit. The District Court had cited Ijischer v. Ciw o f  Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349, 
109 ~ . 3 ' ~  1091 (2005), which we know involved an incomplete application, and which relied 
upon Ilowavd v. Canyon County I3d. O f  Comm'vs, 128 Idaho 479,481,015 P.2d 709,711 (1996) 
for the proposition that, "The burden of persnasioll is upon the applicant . . . to show that all of 
the above requirements were satisfied." Of course, the Howavd case iilvolved a Canyon County 
ordinance that specifically provided that the person or persons requesting relief under the Zoning 
Ordinance shall have the burden of persuasion. Id. 
In the instant case, there is no similar provision in the Boundary County Zoning 
Ordinance. The issue is not who carried the burden of persuasion, but whether there is 
substa~ltial evidence in the record to support the decision. The Gardiners' arguments, again, 
merely reflect their disagreement with the outcome -- essentially their disagreement with the 
Board's determinations as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. This Court, of 
course, "shall not substitute its judgment for tkat of the [Board] as to the weight of the evidence 
on questions of fact." I.C. 5 67-5279(1). 
C. The decision of the Board is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Despite citation to numerous examples of disagreements between the Gardiners and their 
consultant, and the applicant and its supporters, the Gardiners argue in their brief that there was 
no evidence whatsoever to support the Board's decision. In reality, they'rc arguing that they and 
their witnesses were Inore credible than Tungsten and its supporters. In other words, they want 
this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board, on the weight of the evidence as to 
issues of fact 
The Gardiners further argue that there is no evidence to support the finding that there are 
"terms and conditions" which mitigate the potential for negative adverse impacts. This argument 
is puzzling in light of not only the applicant's own application, defining the scope of the 
operations, but also the list of eleven (1 1) conditions of approval which the Board found would 
be "sufficient . . . to assure public safety and to mitigate potential adverse effects": 
(1) All surface mining operations, including crushing, loading, 
tnatcrial storage, etc., shall be conducted on the site and shall not encroach onto 
County Road 46 except as normal traffic. Access shall be by private drive 
approved by Boundary county Road and Bridge. 
(2) Dust abatement measures shall be applied as needed so as to 
minimize dust. 
(3) All operations shall follow "Best Management Practices for 
Mining in Idaho," published by the Idaho Department of Lands November 16, 
1992, or as updated. 
(4) Blast [sic] shall occur on no more than twelve (12) days per 
calendar year. Blasting shall be conducted on a weekday between the hours of 8 
a.m. and 5 p.m. Boundary Coui~ty Planning and Zoning and property owners 
within five hundred (500) feet of the boundaries of parcels RP65N01W172211A 
and RP67N01W200012A shall be notified, in writing, at least fifteen (15) days in 
advance of the proposed date of blasting, specifying the date, time and length of 
time the blasting is expected to occur. 
(5) All blasting shall meet OSHA requirements established at 29 CFR 
Subpart U. 
(6) Crushing operations shall be allowed from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
Monday through Friday between the dates of February 15 and May 2 each year. 
(7) Prior to establishing the pennitted surface mining operation, the 
applicant shall comply with all requirements established by the Idaho Department 
of Lands, to include filing a reclamation plan and posting the required bond. A 
copy of those documents shall be provided [sic] the Boundary County Planning 
and Zoning office prior to the onset of mining operations. 
(8) The Planning and Zoning office shall be notified, in writing, when 
the reclamation bond is redeemed or in the event bond is forfeited. This special 
use pennit shall lapse upoil bond redemption or forfeiture, and no further mining 
operations may take place without issuance of a new special use permit. 
(9) The seven acre portion of parcels IiP65N01W172211A and 
RP65N01W2000012A depicted in the site plan of application SUP 0505 shall be 
formally identified by record of survey filed and recordcd with the Recording 
Clerk of Boundary County. 
(10) Any person or persons employed to conduct blasting operations 
shall be notified prior to blasting of concerns expressed during the hearing process 
over the poteiltial for damage to area water systems, including Trow Creek Water 
Association. 
(1 1) Any person employed to conduct blasting operations [sic] be 
qualified, licensed and insured. 
(AR, pp. 0232-0233). 
Certainly if the Gardiners thought these conditions were at all specious, ill-defined, or 
unenforceable, they were free to suggest additional conditions for collsideratio~l during the more 
than two (2) year course ofthese proceedings. 
The substance of the Gardiners' argurneilts seem to he focused on two (2) issues: (1) the 
potential impact of blasting and crushing operatio~~s on their black Angus cattle operations, and 
(2) the potential impact of blasting on their wells. 
With respect to the impact of the operations on their cattle, the Gardiners presented 
scholarly articles (all hearsay of course), to the effect that stress is bad for cattle. (AR, pp. 0089- 
0107). Mr. Cardiner opined that "blastitlg and the constant noise of a rock crusher would disrupt 
the synchronization process for a successful embryo transfer and artificial insemination program, 
and ~vould make it impossible for [them] to stay in business." (AR, p. 0109). The Gardiners 
were merely speculating, apparently, that the blasting and ciushing would cause noise and 
vibration to travel more than one-half (112) mile Gust to their home from the pit site), across two 
major ridge lines (Amendment to Transcript of July 24, 2006 hearing, p. 7), and still retain 
sufficient intensity to actually stress their cattle. To the contrary, Rick Dinning testified that it is 
physically impossible for the Gardiners to see the pit from their property due to the two (2) major 
ridge lines in between. (Amendment to Trallscript of July 24, 2006 hearing, p. 7). He also 
testified that through the one drilling and shooting in the spring of 2006, the sound was 
"surprisingly quiet and muffled", and described by one of the licensed experts as "a series of 22 
caliber priiners going off with an underground rumble" (in fact, that's exactly what it sounded 
like to him). Id. George Hays, a third generation cattle rancl~er in Boundary County, and the 
President of the Mission Creek Water Association, testified that blasting for highway 
improveinents near Mission Creek was determined not to have caused disruptions to the Mission 
Creek Water Association's wells, id, (Clerk's Transcript July 26, 2005 Nearing, pp. 7-8). Mr. 
Hays further testified that the blasting appeared to be nothing Inore than a "muffled thump" - the 
cows never iooked up from eating their grass." Id. 
With respect to the potential impact on the Gardiners' wells, the Gardiners did apparently 
retain a hydrologist, Ms. Uhlman. I-ler report to the Gardiners is ill the record. (AII pp. 0079- 
0084). Of course, Ms. Uhlman did not attend the hearings in person, where the Board could 
assess her credibility or even ask questions. It appears that the primary risk, from Ms. IJhlinan's 
point of view, is to the Gardiner's irrigation well. Such risk &om the pit excavation, would arise 
when the natural drainage from land surface would be lowered from 1,860 feet to 1,760 feet 
mean sea level on the western-most boundary. (AR p. 0083). Flowever, this was contrary to 
Rick Dinning's findings and observations - not having seen water running out of other rock 
faces (as where the railroad was cut), and the fact that, based upon the well driller's report, the 
bottom of the pit would still be 33 to 53 feet above the water elevation in the well. (Amendment 
to Transcript of July 24, 2006 hearing, p. 7). 
The Board also reviewed Ms. Uhlman's report, and concluded that, based on the distance 
of tlie pit to those wells, testimony from the applicant, and the permit and reclamation plan under 
the jurisdiction of the Idaho Department of Lands, it was "reasonable to determine that direct 
threat to these wells is a remote possibility, and the threat can be further mitigated with 
additional restriction requiring that those conducting the blasting be licensed, certified and 
insured." (Findings and Decision p. 9, AR, pp. 0234). 
There is conflicting testimony on these and other issues pertinent to the Board's Findings 
and Decision. The Board weighed the evidence, found its facts, and made a decision. Again, 
this Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of tlie Board, and should defer to the Board's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Neighbors v. Vallev CounQ 176 P.3d at 13 1. 
There is, furthermore, a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the actions of zoning 
authorities. Id.; Howard, 128 Idaho at 480. The decision of the Board in this matter is supported 
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and should be affirmed on appeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Tungste~~ I-loldings, Inc. properly made application to Bonner County for a Special Use 
Pennit allowing it to conduct a gravel pit and rock crushing operatio11 on seven (7) of its three 
hundred thirty (330) acres near Porthill in Boundary County. Boundary County allows property 
owners to petition the County for a special use permit for uses which are not otherwise described 
or defined in the Zoning Ordinance, includillg gravel pits and rock quarries. The application was 
approved with conditions designed to lninimize potential adverse impacts created by the special 
use. Not all potential adverse impacts are required to be eliminated, but only minimized to 
ensure the proposed special use will not create noise, traffic, odors, dust or other nuisances 
substantially in excess of permitted uses within the zone district. Boundary County's Zoning 
Ordinallce is in accordance with the authority granted to it under Idaho Code § 67-6512. 
The Board's decision to grant the Special Use Pennit is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as a whole. The Board's Findings and Decision includes a reasoned statement that 
explains the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied 
upon, and explaills the rationale Tor the decision based on the applicable provisions of the 
comprehensive plan, releva~~t ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional 
principles and factual inhnnation contained in the record, in conformance with Idaho Code 5 
67-6535. 
The decision of the Board of County Comn~issioners for Boundary County granting 
Tungsten Holdings, lnc. a Special Use Permit should be affirmed. 
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